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I. INTRODUCTION
For almost ninety years, the Supreme Court regarded tying
arrangements--contracts to sell a product only on the condition that the
buyer also take a second product-with deep suspicion under the anti-
trust laws.' The Court's distrust of such arrangements arose from the
danger that a seller holding monopoly power in the market for the first
product (the "tying" product) could extend that power into the second
("tied") product's market by forcing buyers to take an additional product
that they either did not want or would have preferred to buy from another
2seller. The Court's antitrust jurisprudence was dominated by the fear
that a company would unlawfully leverage its monopoly power to ac-
quire market share from competitors or to create high barriers to entry for
new market participants. 3 This fear dominated even though many com-
panies develop tying arrangements for legitimate purposes and not to
suppress competition.
For example, a software company might legitimately refuse to sell
its word processor application (a copyrighted work) unless the buyer also
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1. See discussion infra Part II.A.
2. See discussion infra Part I I.A.
3. See, e.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 12-14 (1984); Times-
Picayune Pub'g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 605 (1953); Fortner Enters., Inc. v. U.S. Steel
Corp. (Fortner 1), 394 U.S. 495, 498-99 (1969); United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 44-45
(1962); N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1,6 (1958).
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purchases the company's operating system. Or a software company
might legitimately refuse to sell its computer operating system software
(also a copyrighted work) unless the buyer also purchases the company's
computer hardware because each product works best only when properly
supported by the other. Similarly, a company might tie the sale of copy-
righted instructions for manufacturing widgets to the purchase of one of
the key ingredients for the procedure-thus facilitating competition by
allowing low volume users to purchase the instructions at a lower cost
while high volume users pay more based on their intensity of use. As
these examples show, a copyright owner may wish to tie sales of differ-
ent products for a variety of economically efficient reasons, including
quality control, consumer satisfaction, reducing overall costs through
economies of scale, and price discrimination.
Since patents and copyrights have the potential to create legally
sanctioned monopolies in particular markets, the Supreme Court has
viewed tying arrangements involving patented or copyrighted products
with particular mistrust.4 For over a half-century, the Court maintained
two presumptions that together prevented any patent or copyright holder
from tying sales of their product to any other item.5 We will refer to the
two presumptions as the "tying arrangement presumption" and the "mar-
ket power presumption." According to the tying arrangement presump-
tion, tying arrangements were per se violations of the antitrust laws if the
company initiating the tying arrangement also enjoyed "market power"
in the tying product market.6 According to the market power presump-
tion, the legal monopolies granted by a patent or copyright were pre-
sumed to confer market power sufficient to bring a tying arrangement
within the per se presumption of illegality.7 No evidence of healthy com-
petition in the tying product market, or even of a particular tying
arrangement's pro-competitive effects, would exempt a patent or copy-
right holder from per se liability under the antitrust laws. 8
Over the past thirty years, however, courts gradually began to ex-
hibit a more tolerant attitude toward tying arrangements, acknowledging
that tying arrangements are not always anticompetitive. In Jefferson
Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, decided in 1984, a majority of the
Supreme Court continued to hold that "certain tying arrangements pose
4. See, e.g., Int'l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947) (applying market power
presumption to patents); United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 157-58 (1948)
(applying market power presumption to copyrights).
5. See discussion infra Part II.A.
6. Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 17-18. "Market power" is defined as the power to charge
supernormal prices. Id. at 27 n.46.
7. Loew's, 371 U.S. at 46.
8. Id.
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an unacceptable risk of stifling competition and therefore are unreason-
able 'per se;' 9 however, four justices argued that the per se rule should
be abandoned.' 0 The same four justices repudiated the long-held notion
that "tying arrangements serve hardly any purpose beyond the
suppression of competition."]I At the same time, lower courts began to
question both the validity of the market power presumption and the ra-
tionale behind it, noting correctly that patents and copyrights frequently
confer little, if any, market power.' 2 After extensive criticism of the mar-
ket power presumption by academics,13 lower courts,' 4 and even the An-
titrust Division of the Justice Department, 15 the Supreme Court finally
eliminated the presumption for patents in Illinois Tool Works v.
Independent Ink.16 As a result, for the first time since the 1940s, a plain-
tiff in an antitrust lawsuit involving a patented product must establish
that the patent holder has monopoly power in the relevant market.17
By eliminating the market power presumption for patent holders,
Independent Ink calls into question the presumption's continued validity
for tying arrangements involving copyrights. While the Court's holding
directly applies only to patents, we present three reasons why, after
Independent Ink, the presumption can no longer be viable in antitrust
lawsuits challenging a tying arrangement involving a copyrighted prod-
uct. First, the Court's rationale for eliminating the presumption-
including citations to extensive academic writings, agency guidelines,
and legislative amendments-precludes the presumption's continued
application in any other context. Second, copyrights are significantly less
likely than patents to confer market power because the scope of the lim-
ited monopoly granted by the copyright laws is narrower than that con-
ferred by the patent laws. Therefore, once the Court has found the pre-
sumption to be invalid in the patent context, there is no reasonable basis
for its continued application to tying arrangements involving copyrights.
Third, as the Court's tolerance toward tying arrangements has increased
over the past thirty years, the Court has become increasingly reluctant to
9. Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 9.
10. See id at 35 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
11. Id. at 34-35; see also Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305 (1949).
12. See A.l. Root Co. v. Computer/Dynamics, Inc., 806 F.2d 673, 676 (6th Cir. 1986); USM
Corp. v. SPS Techs., Inc., 694 F.2d 505, 511 (7th Cir. 1982).
13. See infra notes 87, 91, 94, and 107 and accompanying text.
14. See supra note 12.
15. U.S. Dep't of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm'n, Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of
Intellectual Property § 2.2 (Apr. 6, 1995) [hereinafter Antitrust Guidelines], reprinted in 68 Antitrust
& Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1708, Spec. Supp. (Apr. 13, 1995), available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.pdf.
16. 126 S. Ct. 1281, 1283-84 (2006)
17 Id. at 1291.
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find the market power required to make tying arrangements per se illegal.
Given Independent Ink's holding that "many tying arrangements, even
those involving patents and requirements ties, are fully consistent with a
free, competitive market,"' 8 it would be anomalous to preserve a pre-
sumption that condemns all copyright tying arrangements without requir-
ing any showing of market power or anticompetitive effect.
In Part II of this article we review the history of the Court's tying
cases, chronicling the steady construction of the market power presump-
tion as well as the Court's increasing distrust of tying arrangements in
general. We also note the Court's particular antipathy toward tying ar-
rangements involving intellectual property. We then describe the partial
deconstruction of those presumptions, culminating in the recent abolition
of the presumption of market power for patent holders in Independent
Ink. In Part III, we argue that, consistent with the Court's reasoning in
the patent context, Independent Ink should signal the end of the market
power presumption for copyright holders in antitrust cases. Accordingly,
just as tying arrangements involving patented products are not con-
demned per se, tying arrangements involving copyrighted products
should not be condemned per se under the antitrust laws unless the plain-
tiff is able to prove market power.
II. HISTORY OF THE MARKET POWER PRESUMPTION
A. The Court's Construction of the Market Power Presumption
The Supreme Court's concern regarding tying arrangements
emerged out of patent infringement cases and was only later imported
into the Court's antitrust jurisprudence. The Court's concern was first
expressed in Chief Justice White's 1912 dissent in Henry v. A.B. Dick
Co.19 Plaintiff patentee licensed its patented mimeograph machine on the
condition that the licensee use only its unpatented ink in the machine.20
The Supreme Court held that the use of a competitor's ink, in violation of
21the license agreement, constituted infringement. In response, Chief
Justice White wrote a lengthy dissent, warning that such license agree-
ments granted the patentee "the power, by contract, to extend his patent
rights so as to bring within the claims of his patent things which are not
embraced therein" and "to multiply monopolies at ... will., 22 Two years
later, Congress took heed of that warning and enacted § 3 of the Clayton
18. Id. at 1292.
19. 224 U.S. I (1912).
20. Id. at 26.
21. Id. at 48-49.
22. Id. at 53.
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Act, thereby prohibiting tying the sale of one good to another.23 In doing
so, Congress "expressed great concern about the anticompetitive
character of tying arrangements. 24
Three years after the passage of the Clayton Act, when confronted
again with a contract tying a patented product to an unpatented prod-
uct-a patented movie projector tied to unpatented movie films-the
Court condemned the arrangement.2 5 Movie films, reasoned the Court in
Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Manufacturing Co., are not
part of the patented projector, and, therefore, the purchase of the supplies
elsewhere could not infringe the patent.26 Throughout its opinion, the
Court referred to a patent "monopoly," meaning that the patentee was
granted the exclusive right to make and sell the patented article.27
Although the fact that an article is patented does not mean that it would
be in demand, the Court recognized that the patented projector in Motion
Picture was especially valuable and that the plaintiff had attempted to
control the entire industry through it. 28 Restricting the purchase of
supplies used with the projector would be "[t]he perfect instrument of
favoritism and oppression," empowering the patentee to "ruin anyone
unfortunate enough to be dependent upon its confessedly important im-
provements for the doing of business. 29 When the plaintiff claimed that
its arrangements allowed "the sale of the machine at what is practically
its cost," the Court responded:
This fact, if it be a fact, instead of commending, is the clearest pos-
sible condemnation of, the practice adopted, for it proves that under
color of its patent, the owner intends to and does derive its profit,
not from the invention on which the law gives it a monopoly, but
from the unpatented supplies with which it is used, and which are
wholly without the scope of the patent monopoly, thus in effect ex-
tending the power to the owner of the patent to fix the price to the
public of the unpatented supplies as effectively as he may fix the
price on the patented machine.30
23. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 3, 38 Stat. 730, 731 (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 14 (2000)); see
also Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 517-18 (1917) (explain-
ing that A.B. Dick must be regarded as overruled in light of§ 3 of the Clayton Act).
24. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 10 n.15 (1984) (citing H.R. REP.
No. 63-627, at 12-13 (1914); S. REP. No. 63-698, at 6-9 (1914)).
25. See Motion Picture, 243 U.S. at 518-19.
26. Id.
27. See id. at 516-17.
28. Id. at 519.
29.Id. at 515.
30. Id. at 517 (emphasis added).
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The Supreme Court, in effect, concluded that the plaintiff was
gouging users by collecting twice for the invention-once when the ma-
chine was sold and again when film was used. The Court refused to use
the patent enforcement machinery to "give to the plaintiff such a poten-
tial power for evil over an industry which must be recognized as an
important element in the amusement life of the nation. 31
In subsequent cases defining the extent of patent infringement, the
Court similarly assumed that by tying the purchase of a patented product
to the purchase of an unpatented product, the patentee was extending its
economic control to the unpatented product and thereby restraining com-
petition. 3' The Supreme Court based its holdings in A.B. Dick and
Motion Pictures on the law of patent misuse.33 However, the concerns
that the Court expressed in those and subsequent patent misuse cases
soon migrated from patent to antitrust law. In the first such case, Interna-
tional Salt Co. v. United States, defendant International Salt leased its
patented salt-dispensing machines on the condition that the lessees pur-
chase the necessary salt from it.34 The Supreme Court declared that "it is
unreasonable, per se, to foreclose competitors from any substantial mar-
ket.",35 The Court then concluded, without reference to any evidence or
line of reasoning, that "[t]he volume of business affected by these con-
tracts cannot be said to be insignificant or insubstantial and the tendency
of the arrangement to accomplishment of monopoly seems obvious. 36
But the Court did not identify the monopoly to which it was referring.
Was it a monopoly in salt-dispensing machines? In salt? Apparently it
did not matter. The Court held that International Salt's leases violated § 1
of the Sherman Act and § 3 of the Clayton Act.37
The International Salt decision established a per se rule against ty-
ing arrangements. 38 The Court viewed such arrangements as inherently
anticompetitive, possessing little or no legitimate purpose.39 As Justice
31.Id. at 519.
32. See, e.g., Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 666-68 (1944); Morton
Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 491 (1942); Leitch Mfg. Co. v. Barber Co., 302 U.S.
458, 462-63 (1938); Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131, 140 (1936); Carbice
Corp. of America v. American Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 33-35 (1931).
33. See, e.g., Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1912); Motion Picture, 243 U.S. at
509-10.
34. 332 U.S. 392, 394-95 (1947).
35. Id. at 396.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 395-96.
38. See Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305 (1949); United States v.
Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 522-23 n.22 (1948) (citing Int'l Salt for the proposition that tying
the license of a patented device to the use of unpatented materials is an example of a restraint that is
"illegal per se").
39. Int 'l Salt, 332 U.S. at 396.
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Frankfurter wrote in 1949, "tying agreements serve hardly any purpose
beyond the suppression of competition. ' '40 Consistent with this critical
view, the Court's antitrust jurisprudence during this period implied that
virtually any tying arrangement would be found to violate the antitrust
laws.4' Although the Court purported to require a showing of market
power in the tying product, it managed to find market power in almost
any tying arrangement, including those arrangements in which the tying
product fell far short of market dominance.42 For all practical purposes,
the Court established a true per se rule against tying arrangements, reduc-
ing the requirement that a plaintiff prove market power to a mere formal-
ity, the fulfillment of which was guaranteed.43
The Supreme Court's distrust of tying arrangements reached a pin-
nacle in 1958 with its decision in Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United
States.4 The defendant railroad had sold land along its right of way on
the condition that the buyers use its line for any shipments of commodi-
ties produced or manufactured on that land unless a competing carrier
offered better rates.45 The Supreme Court condemned the tying arrange-
ment as per se illegal under § 1 of the Sherman Act.46 Such
arrangements, the Court noted, fall within the category of "agreements or
practices which because of their pernicious effect on competition and
lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreason-
able and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm
they have caused or the business excuse for their use." 47
In response to the defendant's objection that it had no power in the
market for land, the Court held that market power in the tying product is
48unnecessary. The Court concluded it is enough if the tying product has
sufficient power to command the arrangement: "The very existence of
this host of tying arrangements is itself compelling evidence of the de-
fendant's great power, at least where, as here, no other explanation has
40. Standard Oil, 337 U.S. at 305. The Court continued to express this view throughout the
1950s and early 1960s. See United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 44 (1962) (quoting J. Frank-
furter); N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958) (quoting J. Frankfurter).
41. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 40.
42. See William Montgomery, The Presumption of Economic Power for Patented and Copy-
righted Products in Tying Arrangements, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1140, 1146 (1985); see also Fortner
Enters., Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp. (Fortner 1), 394 U.S. 495, 502-03 (1969).
43. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADoX 367-68 (2d ed., The Free Press 1993)
(1978); see also Kenneth W. Dam, Fortner Enterprises v. United States Steel: "Neither a Borrower
nor a Lender Be," 1969 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 25-26 (1969).
44. 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
45. Id. at 3.
46. Id. at 5.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 11-12.
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been offered for the existence of these restraints., 49 As Judge Robert
Bork would later observe, the Court's logic in Northern Pacific "merely
emphasized the degree to which the entire development of the law of
tying arrangements rested upon an intuition that is held above the ordi-
nary processes of disproof.,5 0
The Supreme Court's approach made it impossible to distinguish
between tie-in sales and any other sales, as was clearly demonstrated in
Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp. (Fortner /).51 The
defendant, United States Steel, manufactured and sold prefabricated
homes.52 It also offered real estate developers particularly favorable
financing for the purchase of land through its wholly owned credit corpo-
ration. 53 Such financing, however, was available only on the condition
that a United States Steel home be erected on each of the lots purchased
by the loan proceeds.54 Fortner, which received one of these loans, sued
United States Steel under §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, alleging an il-
legal tying arrangement.55 The district court rejected Fortner's claim
because United States Steel lacked "sufficient economic power" over
credit, the tying product. 56 The Supreme Court reversed in a 5 to 4 opin-
ion, explaining that the district court had misunderstood the Court's
precedent. 57 "The standard of 'sufficient economic power,"' it noted,
"does not.., require that the defendant have a monopoly or even a
dominant position throughout the market for the tying product., 58 To the
contrary, "the presence of any appreciable restraint over competition
provides a sufficient reason for invalidating the tie. Such appreciable re-
straint results whenever the seller can exert some power over some of the
buyers in the market. . .. .,59 The unique economic ability of United
States Steel to offer financing on unusually advantageous terms,
reasoned the Court, "disclose[d] the possibility of market power over
borrowers in the credit market., 60
The four dissenting Justices argued that the plaintiff had not offered
proof that United States Steel exerted any market power over the tying
49. Id. at 7-8.
50. BORK, supra note 43, at 368.
51. 394 U.S. 495, 508 (1969).
52. Id. at 496-97.
53. Id. at 497.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 496-98.
56. Id. at 499.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 502.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 502-03.
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product. 6' The simple fact that customers purchased the package did not
itself suffice to prove market power in the tying product.62 In fact, as the
dissent noted, "[p]rovision of favorable credit terms may be nothing
more or less than vigorous competition in the tied product, on a basis
very nearly approaching the price competition which it has always been
the policy of the Sherman Act to encourage." 63 In other words, by pro-
viding "ancillary services" in connection with the sale of the "tied prod-
uct," a seller like United States Steel could effectively lower the price of
its product and thereby facilitate (rather than restrain) competition. 64
Ultimately, as discussed below, the dissenters would prevail, but not
until Fortner H reached the Supreme Court eight years later.65
Northern Pacific and Fortner I concerned tying arrangements in-
volving sales of land and prefabricated homes, respectively,66 but the
Court also condemned tying arrangements involving patented or copy-
righted products.6 7 Indeed, the Court had established the per se rule
against tying arrangements in a case in which the tying product was sub-
ject to a patent.68 Shortly thereafter, the Court stated, albeit in dicta, that
a patent "is at least prima facie evidence" of market control even though
"there may be many competing substitutes for the patented article." 69 The
Supreme Court extended this same logic to copyrights in United States v.
Paramount Pictures, Inc.70 The plaintiff in that case had engaged in
"block-booking," i.e., the practice of licensing or offering for license one
or more films on the condition that the exhibitor also license an addi-
tional one or more films. 7 1 The Court condemned the practice because it"add[ed] to the monopoly of a single copyrighted picture that of another
copyrighted picture., 72 "Each [film] stands not on its own footing but in
whole or in part on the appeal which another film may have., 73 In
reaching this conclusion, the Court did not determine, much less discuss,
whether the copyright conferred market power on defendants.
61. Id. at 514-19 (White, J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 517.
63. Id. at 511.
64. Id. at 525 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
65. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., Inc. (Fortner 11), 429 U.S. 610 (1977).
66. See N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1,3 (1958); Fortner I, 394 U.S. at 496-97.
67. See Int'l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947) (patents); United States v.
Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) (copyrights).
68. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 304 (1949).
69. Id. at 307.
70. 334 U.S. at 158-59.
71. Id. at 156.
72. Id. at 157-58.
73. Id. at 158.
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In United States v. Loew's Inc., which also involved the practice of
block-booking films, 74 the Court sounded the death knell for all tying
arrangements involving either patented or copyrighted products. 75 Al-
though the district court found that there was "keen competition" be-
tween the studio defendants, it nonetheless concluded that the practice
constituted an illegal tie.76 The Supreme Court affirmed, stating that
"[t]he requisite economic power is presumed when the tying product is
patented or copyrighted," as were the films at issue.77 The Court
explained that "the existence of a valid patent ... establishes a distinct-
iveness sufficient to conclude that any tying arrangement involving the
patented product would have anticompetitive consequences.7 8
Copyrights, according to the Court, were no different.79
B. The Deconstruction of the Market Power Presumption
In this section, we turn to the "deconstruction" of the market power
presumption in tying cases, including those involving patented products.
We begin with several precursors to the Supreme Court's deconstruction
of the market power presumption as expressed by academics, 80 lower
8I 82 8courts, 1 executive agencies, and Congress.83 Even in the face of such
vocal criticism, the Supreme Court steadfastly recognized the presump-
tion that patents and copyrights conveyed market power in the tying
product.84 That recognition changed, in part, in Independent Ink, 85 which
we also discuss below.
74. 371 U.S. 38,40(1962).
75. Id. at 49-50.
76. Id. at 41.
77. Id. at 45-46.
78. Id. at 46.
79. Id. at 46-47.
80. See, e.g., infra notes 87, 92; see also Montgomery, supra note 42.
81. See generally USM Corp. v. SPS Techs., Inc., 694 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1982) (patents do not
necessarily confer market power and tying arrangements may, in fact, promote efficiency rather than
undermine competition); 3 P.M., Inc. v. Basic Four Corp., 591 F. Supp. 1350, 1358-60 (E.D. Mich.
1984) (party alleging violation of antitrust laws not relieved of burden of showing economic power
with regard to copyrighted product); In re Data Gen. Corp. Antitrust Litig., 490 F. Supp. 1089, 1113
(N.D. Cal. 1980) (patent or copyright regarding tying product not sufficient to establish economic
power).
82. See, e.g., supra note 15.
83. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5) (2000) (eliminating market power presumption in patent
cases).
84. See, e.g., Fortner Enters., Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp. (Fortner 1), 394 U.S. 495, 517 (1969).
85. See Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1281, 1291 (2006).
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1. Precursors to the Supreme Court's Deconstruction of the Market
Power Presumption in Cases Involving Patented Products
a. Academic Critique of the Market Power Presumption
Beginning in the 1960s, shortly after the decisions in Northern
Pacific and Loew's, various commentators began to question the Court's
holding that market power could be inferred from the tying product's
mere "uniqueness" or "desirability to consumers. The commentators
voiced two distinct claims that, when combined, significantly under-
mined the Court's reasoning in Loew's. First, they noted that a product's
uniqueness or desirability, by itself, confers little or no market power.
Although virtually all products are "desirable" in some manner (if not,
they are quickly discontinued), very few monopolize an entire market. 88
In addition, while a product's uniqueness is a prerequisite to obtaining a
monopoly, it does not, by itself, confer a monopoly.8 9 Many products-
such as cars and computers-are "unique" in that they are distinctive or
particularly attractive to consumers, but they nonetheless must compete
for market share in a competitive industry. 90 Second, the commentators
asserted that tying arrangements can produce anticompetitive effects only
when there is substantial market power in the tying product.9' If close
substitutes exist, a consumer will simply choose to buy a competitor's
product rather than pay monopoly prices for the tying and tied prod-
ucts. 92 Therefore, many of the tying arrangements condemned by the
courts under the Loew's test did not in fact produce any anticompetitive
effects. 93
In the late 1970s, then-Professor Richard Posner similarly argued
that, contrary to the assumptions of the Supreme Court, companies may
develop tying arrangements for legitimate purposes and not to suppress
competition.9 4 An example of such a purpose is to charge users a variable
price based on their use of the patented product.95 That is what IBM did,
86. See infra notes 87-96 and accompanying text.
87. Richard N. Pearson, Tying Arrangements and Antitrust Policy, 60 Nw. U. L. REV. 626, 644
(1965).
88. See Montgomery, supra note 42, at 1150.
89.Seeid. at 1150-51.
90. See Pearson, supra note 87, at 644.
91. See Ward S. Bowman Jr., Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J.
19, 20 (1957); see also Montgomery, supra note 42, at 1151-52.
92. See Bowman, supra note 91, at 20, 25. Recall that the objection to tying arrangements
stems from their potential ability, in some circumstances, to grant the manufacturer of a tying prod-
uct monopoly power in the tied product as well.
93. See Montgomery, supra note 42, at 1146.
94. RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 199-207 (2d ed. 2001).
95. Id. at 200.
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as reported in an early Supreme Court antitrust case, when it required
customers leasing its patented punch card machine to use its unpatented
punch cards.96 By increasing the price of the cards while reducing the
price of the machine, IBM could charge users based upon their use of the
machine rather than inefficiently charging the same price to both heavy
users and those consumers who almost never used the machine. Noting
that companies frequently practice price discrimination by simply charg-
ing fees based on direct use of the patented product, 97 Posner concluded
that "[i]t is arbitrary to prohibit doing the same thing indirectly, by
means of tie-ins." 98 Then-Professor Robert Bork echoed this viewpoint in
an influential book written shortly after Posner's, in which he discussed
several other lawful reasons why companies enter into tying arrange-
ments,99 including to protect goodwill 00 and achieve economies of
scale.10' Bork argued that these legitimate uses of tying arrangements
benefit both firms and consumers.' 0 2 He concluded that "there is no
validity to the law's explanation of tying arrangements [because they]
simply do not threaten competition, as the courts have supposed for so
long."' 0 3
After the Court began requiring plaintiffs to prove market power in
most tying arrangements, commentators began to focus their criticism on
the one area where the Court's presumption of market power remained:
tying arrangements involving patents and copyrights.'°4 Again, commen-
tators asserted that, contrary to the assumption of the Supreme Court,
most patents and copyrights did not confer market power.'0 5 To obtain a
patent, a product must be only "new, useful, and unobvious over the
prior art."' 106 Mere novelty or usefulness does not mean, however, that a
96. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131, 135 (1936).
97. See POSNER, supra note 94, at 204 (for example, Xerox installs a counter on its copy ma-
chines, which charges lessees based on the number of copies made).
98. POSNER, supra note 94, at 203.
99. BORK, supra note 43, at 378-79.
100. Tying arrangements protect goodwill by preventing the use of inferior materials with a
patented product, thereby reducing the risk that the patented product will malfunction.
101. Tying arrangements also help achieve economies of scale by lowering selling and manu-
facturing costs.
102. BORK, supra note 43, at 380-81.
103. Id.
104. See, e.g., Montgomery, supra note 42, at 1150; see also Kenneth J. Burchfiel, Patent
Misuse and Antitrust Reform: "Blessedbe the Tie?," 4 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 38 (1991).
105. See, e.g., Montgomery, supra note 42, at 1150-52.
106. RONALD B. HILDRETH, PATENT LAW: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE § 1:7.1 (3d ed. 1998);
see also 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 103 (2000)
(Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent
therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title .... A patent may not be
obtained .. if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the
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patented product will command market power; indeed, many patents lack
any commercial value.'0 7 In most cases, a patent is simply a prerequisite
for the right to compete in a particular market that is saturated with other
products containing unique, albeit similar, patents. 108 For example, no
rational automobile manufacturer would create a new car without patent-
ing particular aspects of its design. Yet that new car is not the only car on
the market; the manufacturer surely faces competition from a number of
other companies that produce similar vehicles. Rather than providing the
patentee with a monopoly, then, most patents confer only the ability to
participate in a competitive market with the assurance that others will not
be able to sell the exact same product with precisely the same specifica-
tions. 10 9 As one commentator concluded, "[t]he economic arguments in
support of the presumption appear to be tenuous .... The presumption is
dangerously close to an antitrust policy divorced from market
considerations .... , 0
b. Lower Courts Similarly Begin to Dismantle
the Market Power Presumption
By the late 1970s and early 1980s, numerous commentators had
criticized the Supreme Court's market power presumption as having little
or no basis in economic reality.' In response, a number of lower courts
took action in the 1980s and 1990s to erode or dismantle the presump-
tion. In 1982, for example, the Seventh Circuit took issue with the mar-
ket power presumption, noting in dicta that "not every patent confers
market power" and that "if any presumption is warranted it is that the tie-
in promotes efficiency rather than reduces competition."'" 2 The Second
Circuit similarly concluded that "[w]hen the patented product, as is often
the case, represents merely one of many products that effectively
prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time
the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject
matter pertains.).
107. See 10 PHILLIP E. AREEDA ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW 1737c (2d ed. 2000).
108. See Pearson, supra note 87, at 644.
109. Pearson, supra note 87, at 644.
110. Montgomery, supra note 42, at 1151-52 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
11. See POSNER, supra note 94, at 203; BORK, supra note 43, at 380-81; Tyler A. Baker, The
Supreme Court and the Per Se Tying Rule: Cutting the Gordian Knot, 66 VA. L. REV. 1235, 1297-
99 (1980); see also 2 PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 409c (1st ed.
1978) ("[P]atents... are not insurmountable entry barriers. Unlike direct entry controls, which block
entry even though the would-be entrant can match or beat the costs of [the] existing firm, patents
offer no protection against the entrant who develops an offsetting or comparable but non-infringing
innovation.").
112. USM Corp. v. SPS Techs., Inc., 694 F.2d 505, 511 (7th Cir. 1982).
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compete in a given product market, few antitrust problems arise. 113 A
number of district courts echoed this view.1 14
The Sixth Circuit's opinion in A.I. Root Co. v. Computer/Dynamics,
Inc. " ' is especially significant in this regard because it openly departed
from Supreme Court precedent. The court refused to apply the market
power presumption, stating in a conclusory manner that it found the lan-
guage in Loew's to be "overbroad and inapposite to the instant case."'1 16
The court did not cite any Supreme Court majority opinions supporting
this interpretation of Loew's.' 17 Instead, the court cited Justice
O'Connor's concurring opinion in Jefferson Parish, which asserted that
patents and copyrights do not necessarily confer market power, 18 as well
as the now-familiar economic literature stating that "more often than
not ... a patent or copyright provides little, if any, market power." 119
Thus, the primary support for the Sixth Circuit's rejection of the market
power presumption was (a) a concurring opinion espousing a view that
had been rejected by the majority of the Court in Jefferson Parish; and
(b) the writings of critics who disagreed with the Supreme Court cases
upholding the presumption. In both respects, the Sixth Circuit was
guided by its view of economic reality rather than binding Supreme
Court precedent. Nonetheless, the Sixth Circuit's view of economic
reality and its rejection of the market power presumption would
eventually find favor in the Supreme Court.'2 0
c. Executive Agencies and Congress Likewise
Abandon the Market Power Presumption
In the late 1970s and 1980s, executive agencies and Congress also
took steps to eliminate the market power presumption. As early as 1979,
a high-level official in the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department
113. SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1203 (2d Cir. 1981).
114. See 3 P.M., Inc. v. Basic Four Corp., 591 F. Supp. 1350, 1359 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (finding
that the copyright on a product does not, by itself, establish market power without an independent
showing of "uniqueness," as purportedly required by Fortner II); In re Data Gen. Corp. Antitrust
Litig., 490 F. Supp. 1089, 1112 (N.D. Cal. 1980) ("[T]he sole fact of the existence of a copyright
notice has not been held to be sufficient to prove economic power.").
115. 806 F.2d 673 (6th Cir. 1986).
116. Id. at 676.
117. See id. at 676-77.
118. Id. at 676 (citing Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 9 (1984)
(O'Connor, J., concurring)).
119. Id. (citing Montgomery, supra note 42, at 1156).
120. See Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1281, 1292-3 (2006).
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noted that patents do not necessarily confer market power.121 More im-
portantly, in 1995, the Justice Department and the Federal Trade Com-
mission jointly promulgated guidelines stating that they would "not pre-
sume that a patent, copyright, or trade secret necessarily confers market
power upon its owner."'' 2 2 In support of their rejection of the market
power presumption, the agencies restated the view, well-established in
legal and economic literature, that although patents and copyrights confer
a limited monopoly in a specific product, they frequently do not confer
monopoly power in an entire market. 123
Another significant blow to the market power presumption came in
1988, when Congress eliminated the presumption in the context of patent
misuse. 124 The new statute stated that no patent owner would be found
guilty of patent misuse by engaging in a tying arrangement involving the
patented product "unless, in view of the circumstances, the patent owner
has market power in the relevant market for the patent or patented prod-
uct."'125 As previously discussed in section II.A, when the Court extended
the market power presumption to antitrust cases involving patents in
International Salt, it used the prior existence of the presumption in patent
misuse cases to justify the presumption's extension to antitrust law.' 26
Thus, by eliminating the presumption in the patent misuse context, the
1988 amendment fatally undermined the original foundation of the
Court's justification for the existence of the presumption in antitrust
law. 127
121. Ky P. Ewing, Jr., Antitrust Div. of the U.S. Dep't of Justice, Address at San Francisco
Patent Law Ass'n (May 5, 1979), in Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) No. 429, at D-l (May 17,
1979).
122. Antitrust Guidelines, supra note 15, § 2.2.
123. Id. ("Although the intellectual property right confers the power to exclude with respect to
the specific product, process, or work in question, there will often be sufficient actual or potential
close substitutes for such product, process, or work to prevent the exercise of market power.").
124. See 35 U.S.C. § 27 1(d) (2000).
125. Id.
126. See Int'l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 395-96 (1947) ("But the patents confer
no right to restrain use of, or trade in, unpatented salt. By contracting to close this market for salt
against competition, International has engaged in a restraint of trade for which its patents afford no
immunity from the anti-trust laws.") (citing Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488
(1942); Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944)); see also supra notes 32-37
and accompanying text.
127. The Court had also justified the existence of the presumption by assuming that patents
generally confer market power. See, e.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 16
(1984)
([l]f the Government has granted the seller a patent or monopoly over a product, it is fair
to presume that the inability to buy the product elsewhere gives the seller market power.
Any effort to enlarge the scope of the patent monopoly by using the market power it con-
fers to restrain competition in the market for a second product will undermine competi-
tion on the merits in that second market. Thus, the sale or lease of a patented item on
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Indeed, one member of Congress went so far as to invite the Court
to eliminate the market power presumption in the antitrust context. 28
Senator Patrick Leahy remarked during debate of the bill that "the Senate
is clearly sending a message to the courts that they would be mistaken to
continue to apply any presumption of market power involving intellec-
tual property rights as automatically granting meaningful economic
power over a particular market in antitrust cases."'1 29 In addition, com-
mentators noted that the continued existence of the presumption in anti-
trust law would create a troublesome anomaly if a court were to hear a
tying arrangement case that involved both patent misuse and antitrust
claims. 130 In such a case, the court would be required to presume market
power in the patented product when evaluating the antitrust claim, but
the same court would be required to demand proof of market power
when assessing the patent misuse claim.' 3 '
2. The Supreme Court Reconsiders and Finally Dismantles the
Presumption in Antitrust Cases Involving Patented Products
The Supreme Court slowly followed suit, first in antitrust cases not
involving patented or copyrighted products 32 and then, most recently, in
Independent Ink, which involved a patented product.' 33 With regard to
antitrust cases in general, in United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner
Enterprises, Inc. (Fortner I1), the Court reinstated the requirement that
plaintiffs prove market power to establish an antitrust violation. 34 In that
case, Fortner's purchase of prefabricated houses from United States Steel
was tied to United States Steel's promise to provide Fortner with favor-
able financing. 35 The Court concluded that although United States
Steel's credit terms were "unique" and Fortner could not have acquired
such financing from any other source, United States Steel did not possess
condition that the buyer make all his purchases of a separate tied product from the pat-
entee is unlawful. (citation omitted)).
See also U.S. Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., Inc. (Fortner fl), 429 U.S. 610, 619 n. 12 (1977) ("Since
one of the objectives of the patent laws is to reward uniqueness, [all patents establish] a distinctive-
ness sufficient to conclude that any tying arrangement involving the patented product would have
anticompetitive consequences."). As has been shown, however, this assumption had long since been
proven false by the time Congress passed § 271(d) in 1988. See supra notes 87-93 and accompany-
ing text.
128. 134 CONG. REC. S17, 146-02 (1988) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
129. Id.
130. See Burchfiel, supra note 104, at 22-23; Ramsey Hanna, Note, Misusing Antitrust: The
Search for Functional Copyright Misuse Standards, 46 STAN. L. REV. 401, 416-17 (1994).
131. Burchfiel, supra note 104, at 22-23.
132. See Fortner II, 429 U.S. 610; Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. 2.
133. I1. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1281 (2006).
134. 429 U.S. at 620.
135. Id. at 613-14.
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monopoly power in the credit market.136 Rejecting the language in
Loew's stating that market power could be inferred from the tying prod-
uct's uniqueness or desirability to consumers, the Court set a much
higher threshold for proving market power: "[W]hether the seller has the
power, within the market for the tying product, to raise prices or to re-
quire purchasers to accept burdensome terms that could not be exacted in
a completely competitive market."'1 37
Despite developing a reasonable threshold for proving market
power, the Court explicitly made an exception for tying arrangements
involving patents.' 38 For these arrangements, the Court reiterated that the
statutory grant of a patent monopoly in International Salt and copyright
monopolies in Paramount Pictures "represented tying products that the
Court regarded as sufficiently unique to give rise to a presumption of
economic power."' 39 The Court nevertheless acknowledged that-at least
in cases that do not involve patented or copyrighted products-tying
arrangements can sometimes serve as a form of legitimate price dis-
crimination regarding the tied product. 40 Therefore, notwithstanding its
refusal to abandon the market power presumption for patents and copy-
rights, the Fortner H court squarely held that not all tying arrangements
are per se unlawful under the antitrust laws.'14
Seven years later, in Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v.
Hyde, 42 the Court expanded the group of tying arrangements that would
pass muster under the antitrust laws. Writing for a five Justice majority,
Justice Stevens upheld the tying arrangement presumption, stating that
"[i]t is far too late in the history of our antitrust jurisprudence to question
the proposition that certain tying arrangements pose an unacceptable risk
of stifling competition and therefore are unreasonable 'per se."' 143 Sig-
nificantly, however, the Court stated that "[t]ying arrangements need
only be condemned if they restrain competition on the merits by forcing
purchases that would not otherwise be made."'14 4 In other words, tying
arrangements involving tied products that a customer would have to pur-
chase from some company in order to operate the tying product were
now permitted. Using this logic, the Court held that the defendant hospi-
tal's use of "tied" anesthesiological services was permissible because
136. Id. at 621-22.
137. Id. at 620.
138. Id. at 619.
139. Id.
140. See id. at 618 n.l0.
141. See id at 621-22.
142. 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
143. Id. at9.
144. Id. at 27 (emphasis added).
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patients undergoing surgery at the hospital would have to use some anes-
thesiologist. 145 As a result, the hospital's requirement that the patient use
a particular anesthesiologist (or choose from one of several selected
anesthesiologists) was a legal tying arrangement. 14
6
The implications of the Court's analysis in Jefferson Parish are sig-
nificant. Under this logic, for example, the tying arrangement that the
Court condemned in International Business Machines Corp. v. United
States147 would be permissible. Since all users of IBM's punch card
machine would need to purchase punch cards from some entity, the fact
that IBM required customers to purchase the cards from it would not
result in an illegal tie. 148
It is unclear whether the Court actually intended to go this far in its
acceptance of tying arrangements. Commentators have noted that the
majority opinion is inconsistent with the body of antitrust tying precedent
and leaves in doubt the circumstances appropriate for applying the per se
tying standard. 4 9 Regardless of the actual effect of the majority's
language, the Court in Jefferson Parish took a position that
foreshadowed its willingness to further consider the legality of tying
arrangements, clearly indicating its increasing acceptance of the legiti-
macy of tying arrangements in certain contexts. 150
Despite this increasing acceptance, the majority of Justices in
Jefferson Parish continued to uphold the market power presumption in
the context of patented and copyrighted products, stating (incorrectly, as
we have seen) that
[I]f the Government has granted the seller a patent or monopoly
over a product, it is fair to presume that the inability to buy the
product elsewhere gives the seller market power. Any effort to
enlarge the scope of the patent monopoly by using the market power
it confers to restrain competition in the market for a second product
will undermine competition on the merits in that second market.
Thus, the sale or lease of a patented item on condition that the buyer
make all his Rurchases of a separate tied product from the patentee
is unlawful.
This argument ignores two of the principal objections to the market
power presumption that had been discussed extensively by commentators
145. Id. at 28.
146. Id. at 28-29.
147. 298 U.S. 131 (1936).
148. Burchfiel, supra note 104, at 51.
149. Burchfiel, supra note 104, at 52; Hanna, supra note 130, at 412-13 n.76.
150. See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. 2, 27 (1984)
151. Id. at 16.
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in the years before Jefferson Parish: (1) that similar patented products
often exist in the same market, so that the consumer's inability to buy the
exact same product from a competitor does not mean that the patentee
has a monopoly in the entire market;152 and (2) that as a matter of eco-
nomic theory, companies with a patented tying product typically cannot
use tying arrangements as a means to restrain competition in an
unpatented product. 53 Nonetheless, five of the Justices apparently re-
mained unconcerned with such objections, and preferred to adhere to the
Court's longstanding precedent on the issue. 154
The four concurring Justices, in contrast, advocated abandonment
of the entire tying arrangement presumption (and hence, also the market
power presumption) in favor of a rule of reason analysis. 155 Instead of
assuming that tying arrangements involving patented or copyrighted
products were per se anticompetitive, the concurring Justices argued that
a tying arrangement's legality under the antitrust laws should depend on
the economic effects of each particular arrangement.' 56 Under the test
proposed by the concurring Justices, the market power presumption
would no longer exist. 157 Instead, when evaluating the economic effects
of a given tying arrangement, a court would consider whether the patent
or copyright holder enjoyed market power in the tying product. 158 Fur-
thermore, market power would be only one of the factors evaluated by
courts in determining whether a tying arrangement violated antitrust
law. 159
The four concurring Justices also likely would have eliminated the
market power presumption even if the tying arrangement presumption
remained in place. 60 In a footnote, they directly contradicted the major-
ity's statement that it is "safe to assume" that a patent confers market
power. 16 1 Citing to a then-recent article criticizing the Court's antitrust
tying jurisprudence, the concurring Justices stated, "[a] common miscon-
ception has been that a patent or copyright ... suffices to demonstrate
market power .... [A] patent holder has no market power in any
152. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 111, at 1248 n.71 (citing Ky P. Ewing, Jr., Antitrust Div. of
the U.S. Dep't of Justice, Address at San Francisco Patent Law Ass'n (May 5, 1979), in Pat. Trade-
mark & Copyright J. (BNA) No. 429, at D-I (May 17, 1979)); Dam, supra note 43, at 23 n.88 (dis-
cussing weakness of presumption as to copyrights).
153. See POSNER, supra note 94, at 198-199; Bowman, supra note 91, at 33-34.
154. Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 16-17.
155. Id. at 35 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
156. Id.
157. See id. at41.
158. Id. at 37-38.
159. Id. at41.
160. Id. at 38 n.7.
161. Id.
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relevant sense if there are close substitutes for the patented product.' ' 62
Four Justices, then, had received the message from the economists' ex-
tensive critiques and argued that the market power presumption rested on
assumptions that well-known scholars had found to be untrue. Although
the Court likely came within one vote of completely dismantling the
presumption in 1984, the majority in Jefferson Parish left it intact. 163
Two decades after Jefferson Parish, the Court finally took the next
step toward dismantling the market power presumption. In Illinois Tool
Works v. Independent Ink, citing the "virtual consensus among econo-
mists" that a patent does not necessarily confer market power, the Court
finally eliminated the market power presumption in all cases involving
tying arrangements and a patented tying product.' 64 The Court based its
decision on several of the factors discussed in detail above, including
Congress's 1988 amendment to the patent laws. 165 Noting that the market
power presumption arose as part of the patent misuse doctrine, the Court
found that Congress's elimination of the presumption in that context"certainly invites a reappraisal" of the International Salt rule, which
extended the presumption to antitrust cases involving patents.166 "[G]iven
the fact that the patent misuse doctrine provided the basis for the market
power presumption," the Court wrote, "it would be anomalous to pre-
serve the presumption in antitrust after Congress has eliminated its foun-
dation."'167 The Court also compared the severity of the patent misuse
doctrine with that of the antitrust laws, noting that while the former
simply prevents the patent holder from successfully suing an infringer,
the latter is a federal crime, the violation of which is punishable by up to
ten years in prison. 168 The Court concluded "it would be absurd to
assume" that Congress desired that the use of a patented product in a ty-
ing arrangement would be a major federal crime but that the same use of
the same product would not constitute the far lesser offense of misuse. 169
The Court also relied upon executive action and economic litera-
ture. It cited the joint decision by the Justice Department and the FTC in
which those agencies declined to presume that patents or copyrights
confer market power. 17 Noting that the government took the opposite
162. Id. (citing William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94
HARV. L. REV. 937 (1981)).
163. Id. at 9 (majority opinion).
164. 126 S. Ct. 1281, 1292 (2006).
165. Id. at 1290-91.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 1291.
168. Id.
169. See id.
170. Id. at 1292-93 (quoting Antitrust Guidelines, supra note 15, § 2.2).
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position in its Supreme Court brief nearly sixty years earlier in Interna-
tional Salt, the Court recognized that the government agencies' new po-
sition provided an additional reason to dismantle the market power pre-
sumption-a presumption that the Court originally created at the
government's urging. 17 1 For the first time, the Court also recognized the
economic reality that patents generally do not confer market power in a
patented product. 172 Rather than finding it "far too late in the history of
our antitrust jurisprudence" to question the market power presumption, 73
the Court instead noted that "the vast majority of academic literature ' 174
criticized the presumption as inconsistent with economic theory.' 75
Beyond the Court's elimination of the market power presumption in
patent cases, Independent Ink represents a significant step in the Court's
increasing acceptance of tying arrangements. After exhibiting blanket
hostility toward tying arrangements until Fortner H and demonstrating
only lukewarm tolerance of certain types of tying arrangements in
Jefferson Parish, the Court struck a much different tone in Independent
Ink, citing the extensive academic literature while concluding that "many
tying arrangements, even those involving patents and requirements ties,
are fully consistent with a free, competitive market.' 1 6 The Independent
Ink opinion represents both a long-overdue acknowledgement that most
patents do not confer market power and a recognition of the actions taken
by other courts, academics, and the antitrust enforcement agencies in
questioning the market power presumption. Although the decision defini-
tively eliminates the presumption for patented products, it does not
explicitly do so for copyright tying arrangements. That issue is addressed
by force of logic in the text below.
III. WHY INDEPENDENT INK ELIMINATES THE MARKET
POWER PRESUMPTION FOR COPYRIGHTED PRODUCTS
After Independent Ink, courts cannot presume that a patent in the
tying product, by itself, confers market power, and plaintiffs must prove
that defendants enjoyed market power in the tying product to prevail on
171. See id
172. See id at 1291.
173. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 9 (1984).
174. Indep. Ink, 126 S. Ct. at 1291 n.4.
175. See id. at 1292 (citing AREEDA ET AL., supra note 107, 1769c; 9 AREEDA ET AL.,
ANTITRUST LAW 1711 (2d ed. 2000); William J. Baumol & Daniel G. Swanson, The New Econ-
omy and Ubiquitous Competitive Price Discrimination: Identifying Defensible Criteria of Market
Power, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 661, 666 (2003); WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 374-75 (2003)).
176. 126 S. Ct. at 1292.
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either an antitrust or patent misuse claim. 177 Although the Court's hold-
ing is limited to tying arrangements involving patented products, the
holding has important implications regarding tying arrangements involv-
ing copyrighted products. We argue below that although Independent Ink
does not explicitly eliminate the market power presumption for copyright
tying arrangements, the presumption has been fundamentally undermined
to the extent that it can no longer be applied.
The argument is based on three key factors. First, the reasoning
articulated by the Independent Ink Court also applies to tying arrange-
ments involving copyrights. Therefore, to remain consistent with
Independent Ink, the Court would need to reach the same conclusion
were it to hear a tying arrangement case involving a copyrighted product.
Second, the scope of the limited monopoly granted by copyright law is
significantly narrower than the monopoly granted by patent law. There-
fore, it would be illogical for the Court to abolish the market power pre-
sumption in patent tying arrangements while preserving it for copyrights.
Third, the Court has increasingly accepted tying arrangements and has
recognized that many tying arrangements do not confer market power.
Therefore, after Independent Ink, the Court would be unlikely to adopt a
position condemning a tying arrangement without proof of market
power. Based on these considerations, we conclude that Independent Ink
effectively eliminates the market power presumption in cases involving
copyrighted as well as patented products.
A. The Reasoning of Independent Ink Applies
Equally to Copyright Tying Arrangements
Although Independent Ink did not directly repeal the presumption
of market power in copyright tying arrangements, the opinion did pro-
vide a number of reasons for eliminating the presumption in patent tying
arrangements. 178 This section examines these reasons and concludes that
in each case, the Court would necessarily come to the same conclusion
were it to address the presumption in cases involving a copyright tying
arrangement. 179 As a result, courts addressing future copyright tying
arrangements must strike down the presumption if their opinions are to
be consistent with the Supreme Court's reasoning in Independent Ink.
177. Id. at 1293.
178. See id. at 1291 n.3, 1293.
179. This section assumes that in any future consideration of the presumption, the Court would
desire to remain consistent with its opinion in Independent Ink.
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1. Congress's Elimination of the Market Power
Presumption in the Patent Misuse Doctrine
The market power presumption's existence in the patent misuse
doctrine was the foundation supporting the presumption in both patent
and copyright tying arrangement jurisprudence. As discussed in Part II,
the Court in Paramount Pictures used the existence of the presumption
in the patent misuse doctrine as the basis for extending the presumption
to copyright tying arrangements. 18 Similarly, one year earlier, the Court
in International Salt had used the existence of the presumption in the
patent misuse doctrine to justify the extension of the presumption to
patent tying arrangements. 181
In 1988, Congress eliminated the market power presumption from
the patent misuse doctrine. 182 As discussed above, the Court in
Independent Ink struck down the market power presumption in patent
tying arrangements primarily because of this Congressional act. The
Court reasoned that by abolishing the presumption in the patent misuse
doctrine, Congress had also eliminated the presumption's foundation in
patent tying arrangement jurisprudence.183
The Court's reasoning is equally applicable to copyright tying ar-
rangements. Regarding patent tying arrangements, the Court in
Independent Ink noted both that "it would be anomalous to preserve the
presumption in antitrust after Congress ... eliminated [the presump-
tion's] foundation,"' 1 4 and also that the Court "has reconsidered its deci-
sions construing the Sherman Act when the theoretical underpinnings of
those decisions are called into serious question."' 85 The market power
presumption in both patent and copyright tying arrangement jurispru-
dence shared the same foundation and the same theoretical underpin-
nings. Therefore, the reasoning the Court used to abolish the presumption
for patent tying arrangements indicates that the court would abolish the
presumption also for copyright tying arrangements.
180. 334 U.S. 131, 157-58 (1948).
181. 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947); see also United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495,
522-23 n.22 (1948) (citing Int'l Salt for the proposition that tying the license of a patented device to
the use of unpatented materials is an example of a restraint that is "illegal per se").
182. See 35 U.S.C. § 27 1(d) (2000).
183. See Indep. Ink, 126 S. Ct. at 1293.
184. Id. at 1291.
185. Id. at 1291 n.3 (quoting State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 21 (1997)).
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2. The Justice Department and FTC's Elimination
of the Presumption for Both Patents and
Copyrights in their 1995 Guidelines
As an additional factor in favor of eliminating the presumption of
market power in patent tying arrangements, the Court discussed the
guidelines issued over ten years ago by the Justice Department and the
FTC (the "enforcement agencies"), stating that the enforcement agencies
will not presume market power in tying arrangements involving patents
or copyrights. 186
Given the broad impact of the enforcement agencies' policies, 87 it
is not surprising that the Court would view the policies as persuasive
when deciding whether to adopt a particular rule of law, particularly
when the enforcement agencies promulgate rules that are less strict than
the judiciary's interpretation of the law. 188 While the Court cites the
changed regulatory guidelines as a factor in deciding to eliminate the
market power presumption for patent tying arrangements,' 89 the guide-
lines provide an equally persuasive reason for abolishing the presump-
tion in the copyright context because the guidelines apply to both patent
and copyright tying arrangements. 190 For that reason, to remain consis-
tent with the reasoning in Independent Ink, courts should consider the
Supreme Court's analysis of the enforcement agencies' guidelines as
persuasive evidence for abolishing the presumption in copyright tying
arrangement cases.
186. Id. at 1292-1293 (citing Antitrust Guidelines, supra note 15, § 2.2).
187. While antitrust suits are sometimes initiated by individual plaintiffs (typically companies
upset at another company's practices), the federal government's antitrust enforcement agencies
engage in hundreds of investigations every year. In Fiscal Year 2003, for example, the Justice De-
partment alone brought 41 criminal antitrust cases and exacted $107 million in fines. U.S. Dep't of
Justice, Timeline of Antitrust Enforcement - Highlights at the Department of Justice,
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/timeline.pdf. Furthermore, many antitrust proceedings initiated by the FTC
take place on the regulatory level (i.e., in administrative law courts) where the policies of the en-
forcement agencies are controlling.
188. Indep. Ink, 126 S. Ct. at 1292-93 (explaining that while the 1995 Department of Justice
and FTC decision not to presume that the existence of a patent or copyright necessarily confers
market power is "not binding on the Court," it does provide a compelling basis for the Judiciary to
do the same in antitrust cases).
189. Id.
190. Antitrust Guidelines, supra note 15, § 2.2 (providing, in relevant part,
Market power is the ability profitably to maintain prices above, or output below, competi-
tive levels for a significant period of time. The Agencies will not presume that a patent,
copyright, or trade secret necessarily confers market power upon its owner. Although the
intellectual property right confers the power to exclude with respect to the specific prod-
uct, process, or work in question, there will often be sufficient actual or potential close
substitutes for such product, process, or work to prevent the exercise of market power.)
(footnotes omitted).
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3. Academic Criticism of the Market Power Presumption
As a final justification for eliminating the presumption in patent ty-
ing arrangements, the Court cites scholarly articles, books, and treatises
that both criticize the presumption and also state that a patent does not
necessarily confer market power.19 1 Although the Court discusses the
academic literature's criticism of the presumption only in the context of
patent tying arrangements (presumably because that was the only ques-
tion before it), the sources cited by the Court criticize the presumption in
the context of both patents and copyrights. 92 These sources also state
that copyrights, standing alone, do not generally confer market power.,
93
For example, the Antitrust Law treatise cited by the Court states that
there is no economic basis for inferring market power based on a patent
alone and that "the basis for inferring [market] power from a copyright or
trademark is much weaker [than it is for patents].' 9 4 The law review
article cited by the Court also discusses the academic criticism of the
market power presumption in both patent and copyright antitrust tying
violations.19 5 In addition to the critiques specifically cited by the Court,
the voluminous academic literature discussing the presumption generally
criticizes the presumption's existence in both patent and copyright tying
arrangements. 196
In abolishing the market power presumption for patent tying
arrangements, the Court in Independent Ink noted that its holding is in
accord "with the vast majority of academic literature on the subject."'1 97
By embracing the academic literature criticizing the presumption,1 98 the
Court implicitly expressed its disapproval of the presumption in all situa-
tions involving intellectual property. This implicit disapproval is an
additional reason why lower courts examining the presumption in copy-
right tying arrangement cases can come to only one conclusion that is
consistent with the reasoning articulated by the Supreme Court in
Independent Ink: the presumption must no longer be considered valid in
either patent or copyright tying arrangements.
191. Indep. Ink, 126 S. Ct. at 1291 n.4, 1292.
192. See id. (citing AREEDA ET AL., supra note 107, 1737a; Burchfiel, supra note 104, at 57
and n.340; HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST § 4.2a (2005 Supp.); LANDES &
POSNER, supra note 175, at 374).
193. Id.
194. AREEDA ET AL., supra note 107, 1737d.
195. Burchfiel, supra note 104, at 57. The article's footnote, specifically cited by the Court,
lists other books and articles, many of which assail the presumption in both the patent and copyright
contexts. Id. at 57 n.340.
196. See, e.g., Montgomery, supra note 42, at 1151-52; Hanna, supra note 130, at 414.
197. Indep. Ink, 126 S. Ct. at 1291 n.4; see also id. at 1292, 1293 (referencing three additional
times when academics and/or economists have disagreed with the market power presumption).
198. Id. at 1291 n.4, 1292.
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B. Copyrights Are Less Likely to Confer Market Power than Patents
Although the Court in Independent Ink did not address copyright
tying arrangements, its logic applies equally to that context because-as
explained in the discussion below-copyrights, on balance, are substan-
tially less likely than patents to confer market power in the protected
product. Accordingly, given the Supreme Court's findings about the lack
of market power conveyed by patents, courts applying Independent Ink
should be even more willing to strike down the market power presump-
tion in copyright tying arrangements because that presumption is
inconsistent with economic reality.
Patents are more likely than copyrights to confer market power
primarily because patent law provides a patent holder with a limited mo-
nopoly that is significantly larger in scope than the monopoly provided
by copyright law.1 99 This difference in the scope of legal protection stems
from the type of material that patent law is intended to protect, as well as
from the broader goals of patent law. 200 Patents are intended to protect an
idea as embodied in a particular invention, product, or process. 20 1 The
goal of patent law is to provide the inventor with an incentive to develop
products that are useful to society and to disclose to the public precisely
how to create those products.20 2 To preserve the incentives for invention
203and disclosure, patent law must provide a strong exclusionary power.
Specifically, patents prevent any entity besides the patent holder from
creating or developing an identical product or a product having the same
features as the patented product but with additional elements,
199. It is important to distinguish between the limited monopoly conferred by patent and copy-
right laws and the more expansive definition of "monopoly" traditionally used in antitrust law. The
former is merely an ability to retain, for a limited period, the exclusive right to produce, copy, or
distribute a certain specific product or work. See Antitrust Guidelines, supra note 15, § 2.2. The
latter implies that a single product or company enjoys market power, meaning that there is a lack of
competition in the entire market for a given product. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S.
563, 571 (1966).
200. See Hanna, supra note 130, at 414.
201. HILDRETH, supra note 106, § 1:7; see also Indep. Pneumatic Tool Co. v. Chicago Pneu-
matic Tool Co., 96 F. Supp. 70, 75 (N.D. I11. 1951) (explaining that "[i]t is not an idea that is pat-
entable, nor the results of a mechanism but a novel device or combination understandably disclosed
in the specifications.").
202. See HILDRETH, supra note 106, §§ 1:2-:4; see also U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 8 (purpose
of the patent laws is "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing ... to Au-
thors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their ... Discoveries."); Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil
Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979) (The purposes of the federal patent system are (1) "to foster and re-
ward invention"; (2) to "[promote] disclosure of inventions to stimulate further innovation and to
permit the public to practice the invention once the patent expires"; and (3) "to assure that ideas in
the public domain remain there for the free use of the public.").
203. See HILDRETH, supra note 106, § 1:8.1.
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compounds, or steps. 2°4 In addition, under the doctrine of equivalents,
patents bar the creation of inventions that are slightly different from the
patented product but perform "substantially the same function in substan-
tially the same way to obtain [substantially] the same result., 20 5 There-
fore, an inventor who creates a product independently will nonetheless
be barred from selling the product if it is identical or substantially
equivalent to a previously patented invention.206 While patents generally
do not confer market power, their strong exclusionary power can, in
some cases, provide the patent holder with a monopoly in a given mar-
ket, particularly in nascent or rapidly developing industries.20 7
Copyright law, by contrast, protects only the expression of an idea
and not the idea itself 208 Put another way, copyrights only protect a work
from being copied, reproduced, distributed, or performed without con-
sent of the rights-holder. 20 9 Unlike holders of patents, copyright holders
cannot prevent the creation of near-identical substitutes.2t0 Indeed, if two
persons independently produce the exact same work, both can theoreti-
cally obtain a copyright in the work.21' Since copyrights confer signifi-
cantly less exclusionary power than patents, copyrights are much less
likely to provide the rights-holder with market power. 212 Whereas patents
force potential competitors to develop alternative technology in order to
enter the market, copyrights do not prevent others from offering substi-
tute works that have largely the same purpose or function as the copy-
righted product.21 3 Because copyrights do not protect ideas, competitors
will often use the same ideas to create similar works that compete in the
214same market. As one author wrote, "[w]hile a patent may prevent any
substitute light bulb, a copyright cannot prevent substitute books, films,
compositions, or computer programs .... Thus, if patents do not them-
selves imply [market] power, [neither] do copyrights.2 z 5
An additional reason why patents are more likely to confer market
power than copyrights lies in the restrictions placed on patent eligibility.
204. Id. §§ 10:2.1-:2.2.
205. Id. § 11:2 (quoting Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605
(1950)).
206. 1 JOHN GLADSTONE MILLS III ET AL., PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 2.15 (2d ed.
2006).
207. See AREEDA ET AL., supra note 107, 1737c.
208. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954).
209. Id. at 217-218; see also AREEDA ET AL., supra note 107, 1737d.
210. See MILLS ET AL., supra note 206, § 6.3.
211. Id.
212. See Montgomery, supra note 42, at 1150 n.63.
213. See MILLS ET AL., supra note 206, § 6.3.
214. See id. § 6.27.
215. AREEDA ET AL., supra note 107, 1737d.
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Since patents bar the creation of identical or substantially equivalent
products, the patent laws require that a patentable product or invention be"new, useful, and unobvious over the prior art" (the previously existing
innovations in the field).216 Copyright protection, by contrast, is available
to any "original [work] of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of
expression. '21 7 The effect of this disparity between the patent and copy-
right laws is that the average patented product is, by nature of being pat-
entable, more likely to confer market power than the average copyrighted
product, which may or may not have any value whatsoever in the
marketplace.218
Because patents provide significantly more exclusionary power
than do copyrights, and because patents are inherently more likely than
copyrights to be of value in the marketplace, patents are more likely than
copyrights to confer market power.219 The Court in Independent Ink
agreed with the economic literature stating that patents frequently do not
confer market power, condemning the market power presumption in pat-
ent tying arrangements. Now that the Court has done so, it would be il-
logical to assume that the presumption still survives in copyright tying
cases, where market power is even less likely.
C. The Court's Increasing Acceptance of Tying Arrangements
Lastly, the Court's long history of increasing acceptance of tying
arrangements, culminating in the Independent Ink opinion itself, suggests
that the Court now will uphold reasonable tying arrangements, including
those involving patents and copyrights, that do not run a large risk of
restraining competition. As discussed in Part II, the Court exhibited an"extremely hostile attitude" towards tying arrangements during the mid-
dle decades of the twentieth century. 220 The Court's attitude began to
change, however, in Fortner H and Jefferson Parish, wherein the Court
began to acknowledge that tying arrangements can in some instances
operate as a form of price competition in the tied product.221 As the Court
216. HILDRETH,supra note 106, § 1:7.1; see also 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 103 (2000).
217. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2000).
218. Granted, not all patents have commercial value. But a patented product is, at least, "new,
useful, and unobvious over the prior art," HILDRETH, supra note 106, § 1:7.1, which increases the
likelihood that it will be of value.
219. See AREEDA ET AL., supra note 107, 1737d.
220. Montgomery, supra note 42, at 1152.
221. See U.S. Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., Inc. (Forner 11), 429 U.S. 610, 618 n.lO, 619
(1977) (credit services were not sufficiently "unique" to give rise to a presumption of economic
power, and at least in cases not involving patented or copyrighted products, tying arrangements can
serve as a form of legitimate price discrimination regarding the tied product); Jefferson Parish Hosp.
Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 27 (1984) ("Tying arrangements need only be condemned if they
restrain competition on the merits by forcing purchases that would not otherwise be made.").
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became more tolerant of tying arrangements, it also became "increas-
ingly unwilling to find the economic power that is a prerequisite to find-
ing tying arrangements per se illegal., 222 Whereas the Court previously
seemed very willing to find market power, despite scant evidence, in or-
der to declare a tying arrangement illegal, the Court in Fortner II and
Jefferson Parish engaged in a more thorough investigation of market
conditions, concluding in both cases that market power did not exist in
the tying product.223 In Independent Ink, the Court finally demonstrated
that it is unwilling to uphold presumptions of market power that do not
comport with economic reality.2 24 At the same time, the Court appeared
to end its hostility toward tying arrangements, recognizing that tying
arrangements often are "fully consistent with a free, competitive
market." 225
The history of the Court's tying arrangement jurisprudence is sig-
nificant both with regard to patents and with regard to copyrights. As the
Court increasingly recognizes that some tying arrangements are justified
for economically efficient reasons, such as quality control, consumer sat-
isfaction, and the like, the Court becomes less likely to find that any
given defendant enjoys market power in a tying product. Therefore, the
Court also becomes less likely to strike down any given tying arrange-
ment as being anticompetitive. Given the Court's newfound acceptance
of patent tying arrangements in Independent Ink, it is logical that the
Court was unwilling to support a presumption of market power in a situa-
tion where market power frequently did not exist.226 To retain a presump-
tion that effectively made all patent tying arrangements per se illegal
would have been not only inconsistent with economic reality, but also
contrary to the Court's new philosophy that many tying arrangements,
including those involving patents, do not suppress competition.
Logically, this acceptance of tying arrangements involving patented
products should also apply to those involving copyrighted products.
IV. CONCLUSION
The market power presumption is a relic developed over fifty years
ago, when the Court believed that "[t]ying arrangements serve[d] hardly
any purpose beyond the suppression of competition., 227 The presumption
served the Court well in an era when the Court desired to condemn
222. Montgomery, supra note 42, at 1154-55.
223. Fortner I, 429 U.S. at 620-22; Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 26-29.
224. See Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1281, 1291-92 (2006).
225. Id. at 1292.
226. See id. at 1293.
227. Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305-06 (1949).
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virtually all tying arrangements under the antitrust laws. However, now
that the Court has recognized that "[m]any tying arrangements, even
those involving patents and requirements ties, are fully consistent with a
free, competitive market,, 228 it would be illogical to retain a presumption
that invalidates copyright tying arrangements without any analysis of
whether the specific tie in question runs any risk of restraining
competition. The Court's reasoning in Independent Ink permits only one
conclusion: the market power presumption no longer has a place in the
Court's jurisprudence.
228. Indep. Ink, 126 S. Ct. at 1292.
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